According to Heidegger, all human activity involves a double teleology. One acts in order to accomplish some end, but one also acts for the sake of being a certain sort of person. Engaging in an act of philosophical interpretation is a paradigmatically human activity. So if Heidegger is right regarding human action (and I believe that he is), any act of interpreting a philosopher’s work must not only be an act that is performed in order to achieve some goal, but also an act in and through which the interpreter acts for the sake of realizing some possibility of human existence.

I have spent a substantial portion of my life attempting to interpret the work of Martin Heidegger. This activity has had, in general, the goal of my coming to understand his work. But human activities rarely have such general goals. Rather, one acts in order to accomplish something in particular. In the case of acts of interpretation such particularity is usually achieved by the interpreter approaching the texts to be interpreted with a leading question in hand, a question that specifies what is to be found out in the interpreting. And for my interpretation of Heidegger this leading question has been specified by my understanding of what it is to be a philosopher. For, while the “in order to” of my interpretation is to understand Heidegger, that for the sake of which I carry out the interpretation, the possibility of human existence that I thereby embody, is that I be a philosopher.

Heidegger himself teaches us that it is the task of the philosopher to raise the question of being. And in this age, to raise the question of being also involves raising the question of human being, the question of the meaning of the being of Dasein. Since Descartes, human being has been understood in terms of mentality, and since Brentano, that mentality has been understood in terms of intentionality. But Heidegger suggests that intentionality itself depends upon being-in-the-world. So the leading question with which I approach the work of Heidegger is just the
question of how we should understand the most characteristic claim of his early philosophy, that being-in-the-world is a necessary condition on the possibility of intentionality. If one could understand this assertion one would also understand Heidegger's answer to the question of the meaning of Dasein's being, and also, one hopes, come closer to answering that question for oneself.

Heidegger typically formulates the dependency of intentionality on being-in-the-world in the traditional language of transcendental philosophy. According to Heidegger, Dasein's being-in-the-world is a necessary condition on the possibility of intentionality. "The Dasein exists in the manner of being-in-the-world, and this basic determination of its existence is the presupposition for being able to apprehend anything at all." Now, if Heidegger is right, and we are warranted in asserting that Dasein's being-in-the-world is a transcendental condition on the possibility of intentionality, then there must be a transcendental argument that supplies the warrant for this claim. And the particular form that my leading question in interpreting Heidegger has taken has been how best to understand this implicit transcendental argument.

One might think that it would be relatively easy to articulate Heidegger's transcendental argument concerning the way in which being-in-the-world is necessary for intentionality. After all, Heidegger was thoroughly familiar with the transcendental tradition stemming from Kant, and acutely conscious that his claim has the form of an assertion of a transcendental condition on the possibility of intentionality. So Heidegger must have realized that he needed a transcendental argument to warrant the claim that intentionality is only possible for an entity that has being-in-the-world as its mode of being. Nevertheless, the structure of this argument is anything but transparent.

The reason for this is that Heidegger's philosophical practice was heavily influenced by Husserl's. According to Husserlian phenomenology it is possible to simply intuit categorical structures, such as the being of Dasein or the essence of the intentional as such. If this is possible, then it is also possible to simply see (in some extended sense of "see") that intentionality is impossible without being-in-the-world. And, in that case, an argument which infers this conclusion from the necessary features of intentionality is unnecessary. So, given the centrality of categorial intuition to his philosophical practice, Heidegger seems to have assumed that he did not need to provide an explicit argument which had as its conclusion that being-in-the-world is a necessary condition on intentionality.

Unfortunately Heidegger's work itself raises several serious doubts regarding the claims of Husserlian phenomenology in general and concerning the doctrine of categorial intuition in particular. To mention just one of these doubts, the possibility of categorial intuition depends upon an assumption regarding the character of our access to our own intentional life that Heidegger's own work seems to undercut. Phenomenology is an essentially "first personal," introspective enterprise. As such, it depends upon our ability to reflectively distance ourselves from our own first-order mental life by having second-order mental intentions directed towards this life. In the Transcendental Deduction in the B edition, Kant had formulated this ability by claiming that it must be possible to attach the "I think" to each of our intentions. But when Heidegger discusses this passage he specifically rejects this understanding of our primary relation to ourselves. And it is anything but clear that his alternative account of our reflective nature, in terms of the way in which we find ourselves in our practical dealings with things, could serve as a ground for claims regarding the intuitive apprehension of categorial structure. So, given Heidegger's own understanding of reflection, it seems that Heidegger's self-understanding of his philosophical practice in terms of phenomenological intuition must be taken with a grain of salt. Rather, many of the assertions that Heidegger presents as being warranted by categorial intuition are in fact warranted, if at all, by transcendental arguments.

Every transcendental argument proceeds in two stages. First, one identifies some feature of intentional states without which they would not count as intentional. Second, one argues that states could not have those features unless certain other conditions were met. So it is of cardinal importance for any attempt at transcendental philosophy that one correctly identify the conditions under which a state, event, or entity counts as intentional.

In the Transcendental Deduction in the B edition, Kant started a tradition which took a certain notion of self-consciousness, that it must be possible for "an 'I think' to accompany all representations," as the basis for transcendental arguments. In saying this, Kant is following a Cartesian and Lockian tradition for which it had seemed self-evident that all mental states, and thus all intentional states, are conscious states. Heidegger has an ambivalent place within this Kantian transcendental tradition. He certainly does not accept the claim from the B Deduction in the form in which Kant makes it. On the other hand, he does accept a cognate claim, that every directing itself towards concomitantly involves
a self-unveiling of Dasein. This might be true of Dasein, as Heidegger thought. And there are indications that Heidegger understood this to be an appropriate starting point for a transcendental argument.

It has never seemed to me, however, that the possibility of self-consciousness or the “I think,” or the concomitant unveiling of self is necessary for intentionality. That is, it seems to me to be possible for there to be intentional states that lack the possibility of being conscious or becoming self-conscious.

I have a number of reasons for thinking that there can be intentional states that are not capable of becoming self-conscious. I will not pause to detail those reasons here. In a preliminary way, however, it is fair to say that all of these reasons turn on the priority, when it comes to intentionality, of action over self-understanding. There seem to be a whole variety of human actions that must be understood in intentional terms, as involving goals, even though the agents of those acts appear entirely incapable of recognizing that they are the agents of those acts or of recognizing that they act as they do because they themselves are motivated by reasons. Examples include not only the standard Freudian cases, but also a wide range of situations taken from experimental psychology and neurology. Certain actions undertaken by patients with various brain lesions and split-brain patients, for example, seem to cry out for understanding in terms of the agent’s goals, or her beliefs and desires, although the agent herself is entirely incapable of intending these goals, beliefs, and desires as her own in the normal way. And once this fact is recognized about human action, a second fact becomes evident. It seems to be necessary to understand many acts of animal agents in teleological terms even though there is no reason to think that those agents are capable of intending themselves as the agent of those actions. And while not all teleology involves intentionality, the phenomena are close enough in structure and closely enough related in the human case to raise interesting questions regarding whether or not certain animal agents are capable of intentional states even though they lack an unveiling of self. So, as I said above, for these reasons and others, it has never seemed to me that the possibility of the “I think” or the unveiling of self is a suitable starting point for transcendental arguments that are designed to determine the necessary conditions on all intentionality.

There are interesting differences between the sorts of intentionality that demand the possibility of the self being unveiled and those that do not, however. For example, any language user or any being that is capable of rationally evaluating her reasons for acting must have intentional states that are capable of becoming self-conscious. So transcendental arguments that take the possibility of the “I think” accompanying intentional states as their base step are not without interest. But insofar as it is possible for there to be intentional states that are not capable of becoming self-conscious, the unveiling of self is not a suitable base step for a transcendental argument designed to show that all intentionality rests on being-in-the-world.

But there are other elements of Heidegger’s analysis of intentionality that do provide such a suitable starting point. Here, it seems to me, is a condition on intentionality that is highlighted by Heidegger and which is necessary for all intentionality. Every intentional state has a content. When one says that some state is intentional one means at a minimum that that state is about or directed towards something and that there is a way in which that state is directed towards what it is about. Beliefs, perceptions, and goal-directed actions are paradigm cases of states, events, or entities that exhibit intentionality. Each of these types exhibit some variety of what is now often called “attitude,” which helps to individuate those states. It is one thing to believe that P and quite another to want that P. But intentional states are also individuated by what they are about or directed towards. My wanting to eat vanilla ice cream is different from wanting to eat chocolate just insofar as one is a desire for vanilla and the other for chocolate. What an intentional state is about or directed towards is, in a broad sense, the content of that state. When Jane believes that there is a door knob on the door, or wants there to be a door knob on the door, or perceives that there is a door knob on the door, or acts in order that there is a door knob on the door, the content of each of these states is that there is a door knob on the door. Similarly, when Jane simply takes a door knob as a door knob by using it as such, what she does is a taking as, and as such it has the content that this thing is a door knob.

But what is it for any event, state, or entity to have content? If one starts from the standpoint of first-person attribution, it might initially seem self-evident and unproblematic that many of our states have content. Descartes defines the term “thought” “to include everything that is within us in such a way that we are immediately aware of it.” So insofar as each of us thinks, each of us is aware of something about ourselves. And what we are aware of about ourselves is frequently that there is a state in us which is different from other states just insofar as it embodies a different idea, a different “form” from other such states (“I understand this term [idea] to mean the form of any given thought, immediate perception of which makes me aware of the thought”), a form that has
“objective reality” just insofar as it “represents” something. So it is built into the very nature of our being, on this view, that there are states in us of which we are immediately aware, that have content, and that we are immediately aware of as having content. So what could be problematic?

This view gets problematized from several distinct perspectives. The perspective that probably most influenced Heidegger was supplied by Kant, who recognized the instability of the Cartesian picture from within the first-person perspective. On this picture our thoughts have two features: they are immediate presentations of ourselves that are about something else. So there is some fact about me, presented to me, which at the same time refers to the not me. But not all of my self-presentations have this additional feature of content. Pains, tickles, mere sensations as opposed to perceptions, lack content. So what, Kant implicitly asks, do intentional states have that these others lack, given that both types involve self-presentation?

Kant also supplied the answer to this question. States with intentional content are states that have objective reference, they refer to objects. This is just to repeat that such states do have content. But states that have objective reference are also objective in the sense that they can be right or wrong depending upon the state of the object to which they refer. That is, any intentional state is normatively evaluable and the standard against which it is to be evaluated is supplied by the content of that state.

Beliefs are the most obvious examples of the normative evaluability of intentional states, and of the way in which the content of the state also supplies the norm for evaluation of that state, but beliefs do not supply us with the most general characterization of the feature in question. Husserl picked out this most general normative feature of intentional states when he spoke of the fact that intentional states can be fulfilled or empty. Heidegger emphasizes this same normative feature of the intentional in his discussion of fulfillment, evidence, and acts of identification in the Introduction to the History of the Concept of Time, for example. I prefer to put the point by saying that all intentional states have satisfaction conditions, and that those conditions are specified by the content of those states.

Any belief, as a belief, can be true or false. That is to say, any belief is normatively evaluable regarding its truth. Whether the belief is true depends upon whether or not a certain set of conditions actually obtains. These are the truth conditions on the belief. For any belief, the conditions under which it would be true are the conditions specified in the content of the belief. Similarly, any act that has a goal can be successful or unsuccessful at reaching that goal. Whether the act is successful or not depends upon whether a certain set of conditions come to actually obtain. These are the satisfaction conditions on the act which are specified by the content of the act. Beliefs are different from overt acts just insofar as they have different sorts of satisfaction conditions which determine how they are to be normatively evaluated. Beliefs are true just in case their satisfaction conditions actually obtain, so those conditions are truth conditions. A goal-directed act is successful just in case its satisfaction conditions come to obtain. For any overt, goal-directed act, the satisfaction conditions are specified by the goal of that act, which is the intentional content of the act, or what it is directed towards. These are the most obvious cases, but other intentional states are also normatively evaluable in similar ways with their contents playing similar roles. When I take a door knob as a door knob by actually using it as such, for example, I am doing something that could be right or wrong, depending on whether or not my taking as a door knob actually reveals a door knob.

This coordination of the content of intentional states with the norms against which these states are to be evaluated gives rise to two deep philosophical problems. First, intentional states are states with objective reference. States with objective reference have satisfaction conditions that are supplied by their contents, which allow for their normative evaluability, which is essential for their objective reference and thus for their intentionality. Now, intentional states are individuated by their contents. So what it is to be any particular type of intentional state is determined by its content, and that content is identical with the norm against which that state is to be evaluated. That is, it is intrinsic to any intentional state that it is to be evaluated in light of its content. But how is it possible for a state to contain the conditions for its normative evaluation intrinsically? Ordinarily, we think that things can be normatively evaluated only extrinsically. As Heraclitus would have it, salt water is both good and bad: Good for fish, bad for us. But it is not evaluative in itself, for to be salt water does not supply a norm for evaluation. Intentional states, however, are not like that. They are, and must be, intrinsically evaluable. How is this possible?

The fact of the normativity of intentional content gives rise to a second deep problem. Because intentional content both fixes the objective reference of an intentional state and also has an intrinsically normative character, the object referred to by an intentional state need not exist. It must be possible for norms, as norms, to fail to be satisfied. So it must be
Possible for intentional states to refer to or be about objects or states of affairs that do not exist. And, because of the surface grammar of our ordinary way of talking about intentional states and the logic of relations, this presents us with a formidable problem, a problem which is central to both Heidegger's philosophical development and my appropriation of Heidegger.

In ordinary language we usually assert the presence of an intentional state by specifying an agent that has that state, the content of that state, and by using a verb that takes a grammatical object to express how that agent stands vis-à-vis that content. I believe that 2 + 2 = 4; I am attempting to open the door. This syntactical structure suggests that when an agent is in an intentional state, that agent stands in some sort of relation with the content of that state. But what sort of object is the intentional agent related to? There seems to be something wrong with each of the candidates for the role of second relata, the content relata. It is a necessary feature of any attribution of a relational property that all of the relata involved in the relation must exist. If Valerie is taller than Anna, both Valerie and Anna exist. But I can think about my sixth child, even though she does not exist, never did, and never will. So the object implicated in the content cannot be the entity involved in the relation. Nor, for similar reasons, can the actual state of affairs that in normal contexts is involved in intentional content be the second relata. I can believe that it is raining even when it is not raining, that is, even though there is no state of affairs that is the raining. Nor can the relata be the thought or representation of the object or the thought of the state of affairs involved in the content. If some representation were the object about which I think when I think, then it would be literally false to say that unicorns do not exist, and if what I am related to were the representation or thought of the state of affairs, then whether or not some state of affairs actually obtained would be irrelevant to the truth of the belief that it did. Finally, one can think of the second relata involved in content as an abstract object, such as a proposition. But this option just reiterates the initial problem. The belief that p is supposed to involve a relation to the proposition p, and that proposition is a real, but abstract entity. But that proposition means that p. That is, it is related in a particular way to the possible state of affairs p. But what is it for an abstract object to be related to some possible, but not necessarily actual, state of affairs?

The early Heidegger was centrally aware that it is necessary to any intentional state that it appear to have a relational structure but that it is not necessary that both of the relata of this "relation" need exist. Indeed, there are numerous indications that Heidegger took this relational structure, in which an intentional agent seems to be related with an object that need not exist, to be the central fact about intentionality that needs to be understood.8

The difficulties involved in understanding the second relata of intentional "relations" led Heidegger to reject the supposition that being in an intentional state involved any real relation. Rather, he tells us, the "relation" involved in such intentional states is not a relation between two actual entities, but "intrinsic" to the intentional state itself. He says of perception, for example, that "the expression 'relation of perception' means, not a relation into which perception first enters as one of the relata and which falls to perception as in itself free of relation, but rather a relation which perceiving itself is, as such."9

But this account by itself is incomplete and unsatisfying. It is best seen as a way of understanding intentional states rather than an account of how such states are possible. Question: what sort of relation does my having a desire for an ice cream cone involve between me and ice cream cones? Answer: it is just intrinsic to my desire, as the desire that it is, that it is a desire for an ice cream cone. Well I knew that: that is just to say that it is a desire for an ice cream cone, that is, a desire that is evaluable regarding satisfaction by whether or not I come to have an ice cream cone. But what is it for a desire to be that desire? Intentional states are partly individuated by their contents, and those contents pick out particular objects and states of affairs. What is involved in that "picking out" if it is not a real relation? In order to understand intentionality we must see how to answer this question.

But if this is the case then we have finally encountered a suitable base step for a rational reconstruction of Heidegger's transcendental argument to the conclusion that being-in-the-world is a necessary condition on all intentionality. According to Heidegger, all intentional states are such that they intrinsically involve a being related to an object in such a way that that object provides for the possibility of the intrinsic evaluability of the intentional state, even though the intentional object need not, in fact, exist. So, whatever is necessary for the possibility of this sort of relatedness to entities, is a necessary condition on intentionality. And, Heidegger tells us, being-in-the-world is such a condition.

How are we to understand this claim? Why is being-in-the-world necessary for the intrinsic normative evaluability and peculiar relational structure of intentionality? To answer this question one must first
understand the structure that Heidegger names “being-in-the-world.”

There are a number of different ways of gaining access to the structure that Heidegger identifies as being-in-the-world. For me, the most suggestive has always been by way of the examples that he gives of “being-in.” For Heidegger, only an entity of a certain type, one that has being-in-the-world as its mode of being, can have intentional states. And any entity that is in-the-world must be in the world, in the sense of being-involved-with the world, or so Heidegger informs us. But when is it the case that an entity is “being-in”? Well, here are some of the modes in which an entity can be in the sense of being involved with: “working on something with something, producing something, cultivating and caring for something, putting something to use, employing something for something, holding something in trust, giving up, letting something get lost, interrogating, discussing, accomplishing, exploring, considering, determining something.”

Different readers read this list from different perspectives, and different features of these states are salient depending upon which of those perspectives one occupies. From my perspective, what is salient about the activities on this list is that they are activities. It is a necessary condition on “working on something with something,” for example, that the one who does this does something, that is, engages in some overt action, and that it be true of that action that it has some point. The central fact about the items on this list is that they are all overt activities that are correctly describable as fitting the teleological category of having a goal. And if these activities are paradigmatic examples of being-in, and only entities that have being-in-the-world as their mode of being can have intentional states, then this suggests the thesis that only agents that act for ends can have intentional states, that is, the thesis that intentionality rests on a bedrock of teleology. That is, if being-in-the-world is necessary for intentionality, as Heidegger claims, and the ability to act teleologically in order to achieve goals is necessary for being-in-the-world, as Heidegger's examples suggest, then an agent’s having the ability to act teleologically in order to achieve goals is necessary for that agent to have intentional states. This, I take it, is the most plausible way to understand the transcendental argument that stands behind Heidegger’s claim that being-in-the-world is necessary for intentionality. An agent’s being-in-the-world is necessary for the possibility of that agent having intentional states because only agents that can act for goals can have intentional states.

Here is how to flesh out the connections. Consider, for example, the act of “producing something,” say a cake. Insofar as one is doing is properly described as [trying to] produce a cake, what one does has a content. What one does is directed towards there being a cake of such and such type. There would seem to be only two possibilities concerning how we understand that in virtue of which this activity has a goal, and thus a direction and a content. Either what the agent does is directed towards the possible state of affairs of there being a cake, and has the content that there should be a cake, in virtue of it being caused in the appropriate way by internal states of the agent that have the appropriate content (she desires that there be a cake and believes that acting in this way produces the cake), or the action itself has the direction and content that it does somehow independently of the agent’s beliefs and desires. But Heidegger insists that being-in-the-world is necessary for the intentionality of any states, so it would seem that he cannot explain the directionality of paradigmatic modes of being-in, goal-directed acts, by appeal to the intentionality of the states for which the directionality of the modes of being-in are necessary, mental states. That is, for Heidegger, the goal-directedness of producing a cake cannot depend upon the mental content of the agent’s beliefs and desires. For Heidegger, the goal-directed teleology of involved being-in-the-world cannot rest on the mental content of conscious or unconscious internal states.

So let us assume that Heidegger is right in this view. We are left with the alternative hypothesis regarding action, that the directionality of the paradigmatic modes of being-in, of goal-directed activity, is primary and the intentionality of mental states is secondary. But the adoption of this hypothesis shows how it is possible for there to be a state that is apparently relational but does not imply the existence of that to which it is related. For overt, goal-directed actions have the remarkable property of being directed towards possible states of affairs that do not currently exist and perhaps never will. And they have that property in virtue of their relations to other states of affairs that do exist, but which are not the state of affairs towards which they are directed.

Consider the conditions under which we would feel ourselves warranted in saying that someone was acting in order to achieve some goal, say producing a cake. We would say that someone was attempting to produce a cake only if she engaged in a series of actions which were related to each other and to the environment in which they occur in such a way that, taken together, they would tend to result in there being a cake were each of them “successful.” The agent opens the refrigerator, gets the eggs, cracks them in a bowl, beats them, adds milk and flour, pours
the mixture in a pan, etc. Each of these steps in the process is described in terms of what it is “in order to” bring about, the eggs being cracked, being beaten, etc. Now, were all of these discrete acts to achieve the result in terms of which they are described, the cake would be produced. That is, they are all “in order to” produce a cake. On the other hand, taken by itself, none of these acts physically described need have the goal that it has. My moving my arm in the direction of the refrigerator handle need not be in order to open the door, let alone in order to bake a cake. The goal of that motion is no intrinsic property of that motion. It is only because that motion took place within the context of the overall production of a cake that it counts as instrumental to that goal. So, it would seem that an act having a goal is a holistic property in the sense that no event can have a goal unless it is appropriately related to other events that also have goals, in virtue of their relations.

But it is also the case that no act can have a goal unless it involves relations with the real environment. Each of the component acts of producing a cake might fail, in the sense of not bringing about the state of affairs that it is interpreted as having as a goal. The egg might fail to crack, for example. But unless the agent did something in the real world which would result in the egg cracking under some conditions, the act could not count as occurring in order to bring about a cracked egg. And this is true both of each of the component acts of the activity of producing a cake and of the overall activity as a whole.

So “acting in order to” involves, at the least, both a complex set of relations among a series of real overt actions and a complex set of relations between the agent of those actions and its real environment. But it would not seem to require any real relation between the agent or her acts and any cake, concrete, abstract, or representational. That is, producing a cake is an activity that counts as “in order to” produce a cake in virtue of real relations among real but non-cake entities.

And here is the answer to the question of how it is possible that intentional states have the peculiar relational character they have. Intentionality is in some way modeled from and piggybacks on the teleological “relation” of an activity having a goal. Saying that an activity has a goal, say, producing a cake, is not saying that there is some relation between that activity and some ghostly state of affairs, the cake having been produced, which is the goal. Rather, to say that an activity has the goal of producing a cake is to describe that activity as relating to its environment in such a way that it would bring about a cake under some definite conditions. So, having goal G is a holistic, relational characteristic of an act, but it does not involve any relation to G. Activities have goals, but there is nothing that is a goal. To say that intentionality is modeled on teleology, then, is to say that for an intentional state I to have a content C, is for I to have a holistic relation of a certain sort with other states of the agent of I and with that agent’s environment, but that I need not have any real relation with the possible state of affairs, C. And to say that intentionality piggybacks on teleology is to say that no agent can count as having intentional states unless it also counts as overtly acting for goals, for what it is for any agent to have intentional states must be understood in terms of the relation between those states and what the agent does in order to accomplish its goals. This, I take it, is the essential core of Heidegger’s claim that being-in-the-world is a necessary condition on intentionality. We understand what it is for a Dasein to have intentional states by way of understanding how those states are related to what the entity does in order to bring about results, rather than understanding what it is for an agent to act in order to bring about results by way of those acts’ relations with the agent’s intentional states.

The reason we specify intentional acts, overt and mental, through an identification of the content of the act is also evident on this view. There are lots of ways to act in order to crack an egg, physically described. But all of these physical events share one feature which is salient when one is trying to figure out what an agent is up to. They all would result in an egg being cracked were they successful. That is, the feature of overt physical events which serves to type acts as “in order to crack an egg” is a possible state of affairs, a state of affairs that would result from these acts under certain possible conditions. So it is intrinsic and essential to any act directed towards the goal of cracking an egg, so described, that it has that goal, even though what it is for the act to have that goal does not involve any real relation with any actual egg having been cracked, but merely real relations with other acts and entities in the agent’s environment.

That overt actions that are performed in order to achieve some goal are typed and thus individuated by their goals shows how it is that intentional states can be intrinsically normative. For the goal of an act is no actual state of affairs. Rather, it is just that possible state of affairs which would come to exist were the act successful. That in virtue of which an act is typed as in order to G is intrinsically normative: G, which is both the goal of the act and that in virtue of which the act is typed, is just that norm that is to be used in evaluating this class of acts for success. So if one could give an articulation of what it is for an act to have a goal,
one would also at the same time show why it is that such acts stand under intrinsic norms. And if, as I suggested above, mental intentionality piggybacks on overt teleology, then one must understand the normativity of the intentional in terms of the normativity of the teleological.

There is a sense in which this Heideggerian suggestion looks as if it is "behaviorist," but it really is not. The behaviorists tried to understand the content of mental states in terms of the input and output conditions on dispositions to act, those inputs and outputs described in non-teleological terms. That is, the behaviorist project is essentially reductive. This understanding of the claim that being-in-the-world is necessary for intentionality, on the other hand, is holistic: one is asking how a set of actions which each have a goal must be related if any of them is to have a goal. It goes on to interpret the intentional states of the agent in terms of their relations with the activity of the agent described in teleological terms. Instead of the behavioristic reduction of intentionality to dispositions to behavior physically described, one places intentionality in the context provided by the real goal-directed activity of an agent in the world.

It also looks as if this view is almost identical with Davidson's project, but once again it really is not. For Davidson thinks that overt actions have a goal only if they are caused in the right way by states of the agent which have the appropriate content. On the current Heideggerian inspired view, on the other hand, agents can have states with intentional content only if they act in the world in ways that admit of teleological descriptions, but agents can act in ways that are correctly described teleologically, even if they have no mental states with intentional content. That is, being-in-the-world is a necessary condition on the intentionality of mental states.

This, then, is the character of my appropriation of Heidegger. I took it to be the case that Heidegger needed a transcendental argument that led to the conclusion that being-in-the-world is a necessary condition on intentionality. I was led to the view that Heidegger took the key features of intentionality to be the fact that intentional states are related to their objects in such a way that those objects need not exist and that the content of an intentional state provides an intrinsic norm for the evaluation of that state. What I appropriated from Heidegger is the suggestion that both of these essential features of intentional states are possible only for a being that is capable of overt, goal-directed activity, that is, that is capable of teleological behavior.

This way of describing what I learned from Heidegger also serves to highlight the nature of my differences with Heidegger. Where I disagree with Heidegger is only on the issue of whether or not Dasein's mode of intentionality is the only possible type of intentionality. Heidegger is right in thinking that Dasein's mode of intentionality always involves a concomitant unveiling of self. In teleological terms, this fact shows up in the fact that Dasein being-in-the-world always involves a relation between "the in order to" of acts (or, perhaps more properly, the "in order to" of tools) and the "for-the-sake-of" of the agent of the act or the user of the tool. What any Dasein does is always for the sake of some possible way of being Dasein, rather than being done merely in order to realize some possible overt state of affairs. And Heidegger correctly sees that the "for-the-sake-of" is not reducible to or analyzable in terms of the "in order to" relation. It is not so reducible because what Dasein does always arises out of a self-conception that the Dasein is always already attempting to embody. I did write this paper in order for it to be the case that I could publish it. But, and this is an important but, this is not the sort of goal this act could have unless I understood myself as a philosopher and was acting for the sake of my being a philosopher. So whatever conditions there are on understanding oneself as being some possible type of Dasein in and through acting for the sake of being that possible way of being Dasein are necessary conditions on acting in order to realize Daseinish sorts of goals.

Now, if Dasein's mode of intentionality were the only possible form of intentionality, then these conditions on acting in terms of a practical understanding of one's own mode of being would be conditions on any agent having intentional states. And Heidegger makes this limiting assumption. He holds the modified Kantian view that I articulated above that a concomitant unveiling of self is a necessary condition on all intentional states. Heidegger, in essence, is producing an extended transcendental argument which takes a version of the Kantian starting point as its base step: All intentional states are possible only in light of an existential self-understanding, so whatever is necessary for existential self-understanding is necessary for our type of intentionality.

Heidegger thus takes the Daseinish form of intentionality as basic. And since for Heidegger human intentionality is basic, so is human teleological behavior. And if this is the case, then the sorts of normativity associated with this behavior, acting for the sake of realizing socially prescribed ways of being Dasein and acting with tools as they are to be used in a culture, are the basic forms of normativity. If animals can be understood as having intentional states it is only as a kind of deficient case of Dasein. In taking this stand, Heidegger does not break with modernity; he continues the tradition that stretches from Descartes and
Kant through Wittgenstein, Sellars, and Robert Brandom. But it is not a
tradition in which I place myself.

Rather, I place myself in an older naturalistic tradition that starts with
Aristotle and runs through Leibniz and Dewey, that sees human
intentionality and teleology as species of animal intentionality and
teleology. I accept the profoundly anti-Heideggerean views that we are
rational animals, and that to understand what is necessary for our
teleological behavior and our intentional life one must first understand
the simpler teleological behavior and intentional life of non-Daseinash
animals. Agents can act for goals even though they never can become
conscious of themselves, and never act in terms of any self-understand-
ing, and to understand us we must understand them.

Thus, I can only appropriate from Heidegger the suggestion that
teleology is necessary for intentionality, not Heidegger’s own specific
analysis of teleology, which presupposes that human goal-directed
action is basic. On the other hand, Heidegger has many valuable insights
regarding the distinctively human form of intentionality and its relation
to the distinctively human form of action. And these are insights that I
fully intend to appropriate, beginning now.

NOTES

1 Martin Heidegger, _The Basic Problems of Phenomenology_, trans. Albert Hofstad-
2 See, for example, Martin Heidegger, _History of the Concept of Time_, trans.
4 See my _Heidegger’s Pragmatism: Understanding, Being, and the Critique of Metaphys-
5 Heidegger, _The Basic Problems of Phenomenology_, pp. 158.
6 See, for example, _The Basic Problems of Phenomenology_, pp. 158–73.
7 Descartes, _Objections and Replies_, in _The Philosophical Writings of Descartes_, vol. 2,
trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murch (Cam-
8 Ibid., pp. 154–8.
9 Ibid., p. 61.
10 _History of the Concept of Time_, p. 159.