IN TWO RECENT articles, I argued that one of the early Heidegger's most significant contributions to transcendental philosophy involved a major rethinking of the nature of self-consciousness. "Transcendental self-consciousness" is always understood by Kant to involve a conceptual representation of the act in which a subject conceptually represents an object. Heidegger, on the other hand, argues that, while "the self which the Dasein is, is there somehow in and along with all intentional comportments," the intention directed toward the self is not properly seen as either a representation or as conceptual. Rather, Heidegger suggests, "we understand ourselves and our existence by way of the activities we pursue and the things we take care of." The self is primarily tacitly intended as that "for the sake of which" things matter to us and our activities make sense. For Heidegger, it is only insofar as our interactions with things are implicitly organized in terms of a style of life embodied in such a "for-the-sake-of" that we are capable of using concepts to make judgments concerning objects, or to cognize ourselves as the subject of our experiences.

If, as I have previously argued, Heidegger systematically rethinks the nature of the "I think," this suggests that he must also have rethought the role of the "I think" in transcendental arguments. For Kant, the ability to attach the "I think" to all of my representations is tied up with the ability to form judgments, and this ability in turn is essential for the ability to cognize objects independent of our apprehensions of them, and the capacity to form a coherent, unified experience of an objective world. But Heidegger thinks that it is a mistake to think of the basic form of our self-apprehension in terms of a conceptual representation accompanying our other representations and to think of the activity of judging as the most basic human intentional
of x with the possibility of x being "thought" by me as a representation of z. Indeed, Kant is quite clear, both in the Critique and elsewhere, that he believes that it is possible for there to be a representation of z in me of which I am not even conscious, let alone capable of thinking. In the division of types of representations in the Dialectic, for example, Kant distinguishes between the genus "representation" and its species, perceptio, or "representation with consciousness." More importantly, in the Jäsche Lectures on Logic Kant continues the division by distinguishing between two forms of perceptio: to be acquainted (kennen) with something, "or to represent something in comparison with other things, both as to sameness and as to difference," and to be acquainted with something with consciousness, or cognition (erkennen). Both of these, Kant tells us, involve intentions directed toward objects, but animals are only acquainted with objects, they do not cognize them. "Animals are acquainted with objects too, but they do not cognize them." It is only in the next division that Kant reaches understanding, "to cognize something through the understanding by means of concepts, or to conceive." So, for Kant in 1800 (the date of the Jäsche Logic), it is possible for an agent to have a representation of something, be conscious of that representation, and even represent that representation in relation to others in respect to sameness and difference, and thus be acquainted with objects, without that agent using concepts or being conscious that they are acquainted with objects. And, since in the Jäsche Logic Kant uses "to think" as equivalent with "to cognize with concepts," it is obvious that when he says in the B-Deduction that if it were impossible for the "I think" to accompany a representation of x, then x could not be thought by me, this can't be equivalent to saying that if it were impossible for the "I think" to accompany x, it would be impossible for x to be a representation of z. For Kant, the possibility of the "I think" is not a necessary condition for representation, or even for acquaintance with objects. If it were, animals could not be acquainted with objects, and, according to the Kant of the late critical period, animals are acquainted with objects.

For what, then, is the "I think" necessary? For Kant, it is primarily necessary for two things, both of which are mentioned in the famous statement quoted above: "thinking" a representation as a representation of an object; and a representation, and the object represented by that representation, being something "to" me. But how are we to interpret these?

What does Kant mean when he talks about "something represented in me which is thought"? One of the keys to interpreting this possibility is given in Kant's division of representations in the Lectures on Logic. He tells us that animals, who are incapable of having the "I think" accompany their representations, can be acquainted with objects perceptually, and even represent similarities and differences, but they can't cognize objects. To be acquainted with something is to "represent something in comparison with other things,"

comportment. Instead, he suggests that there is a self-understanding involved in a distinctively human type of overt, practical activity that is a necessary condition for both the use of concepts in a judgment and the capacity to think the "I think." In this chapter, I discuss the way in which Heidegger constructs a transcendental argument that, first, links practical self-understanding in a "for-the-sake-of" with the ability to intend entities as entities by engaging in certain distinctively human activities, and, second, treats both of these as conditions on the ability to judge and on the capacity to understand oneself in explicitly conceptual terms. Before doing this I briefly summarize the role that Kant gives to the "I think" in his transcendental arguments.

1. Kant on Judgment and the "I Think"

For Kant, "It must be possible for the 'I think' to accompany all my representations; for otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be thought at all, and that is equivalent to saying that the representation would be impossible, or at least would be nothing to me." This assertion, while pithy and memorable, is also unfortunately written in such a way that it is easy to misinterpret. Kant clearly is committed by this statement to the view that the possibility of the "I think" accompanying some representation is necessary for the possibility of that representation being thought as the representation of something. This is what the crucial second clause asserts. It is possible to think of some representation as representing some thing only if it is possible for the "I think" to accompany this representation. But does this imply that for x to be a representation of some thing it must be possible for the "I think" to accompany it? That of course depends upon whether or not the possibility of x being thought as a representation of z is essential to x being a representation of z. And this seems to be the import of Kant's third clause, where he says that to say that "something represented in me could not be thought" is equivalent to saying that "the representation is impossible." But then he apparently takes this equivalence back in the final, parenthetical clause. According to this final parenthesis, the assertion "representation x cannot be thought by me as representing z, because I can not affix the 'I think' to it," is not equivalent to "x representing z is impossible, because I can not affix the 'I think' to it," but, rather, to "it (x, z) would be nothing to me if I could not affix the 'I think' to it." And this is clearly a different claim than the stronger claim, seemingly asserted in the second clause, that no object can be represented without the possibility of the "I think." But which of these is Kant's considered opinion on the status and role of the "I think"?

There is excellent reason to believe that the final parenthetical clause governs the whole and that Kant does not equate x being a representation
both as to sameness and as to difference." Cognition, on the other hand, Kant says, is being acquainted with something with consciousness. The acquaintance side of this division is clear enough. When one is acquainted with an object one represents that object as similar to and different from other objects. When my dog Mac sees other dogs he reacts in similar fashion to all of them but differently in each of those cases than he does when he sees a squirrel. And this gives us reason to believe not only that his representations of the dogs are similar to one another and different from his representations of squirrels, but also that in some sense Mac synthesizes these representations and compares them in regard to their similarities and differences. In Kant's terms, Mac represents the dogs in comparison with the squirrels in respect to sameness and difference. But what, then, does cognition, of which Mac is incapable, add? Kant says that cognition is acquaintance with consciousness. And at first sight this is odd, because an act in which one is acquainted with an object, such as Mac perceiving the difference between a dog and a squirrel, is already itself a conscious representation for Kant. So what can he mean when he says that cognition is being acquainted with something with consciousness?

Although it is not the case that for Kant all conscious states are intentional (he does not appear to take feelings, for example, to be intentional), he does treat many conscious states as having an intentional component. In the division of kinds of representations in the Jäsche Logic, for example, he says that the division is "in regard to the objective content" of these representations. That is, acquaintance is different from cognition, and simple perceptual cognition is different from a conceptual cognitive understanding, in respect to what is represented in these various states. From this perspective, when Kant speaks of cognition as acquaintance with consciousness (his emphasis), what is differentially conscious in cognitive states is not the state itself, (both acts of cognition and acts of acquaintance are conscious states), but rather the content of those states. That is, Kant is suggesting that the differentia of cognitive acts is that the acts of acquaintance in which the sameness and difference of objects is represented are themselves consciously represented in cognitive acts. So, to return to Mac, he represents dogs and squirrels differently (if he didn't he wouldn't be a very successful animal), and he can even distinguish between them when instances of both are present. That is, he can represent something in comparison with other things, both as to sameness and as to difference. But he does not represent that sameness and difference itself as such. That is, Mac is incapable of intending that he represents dogs and squirrels differently, and that these representations differ from one another in such and such respects. It is for this reason that Mac is incapable of using concepts, and also for this reason that Kant tells us that understanding, or the ability to conceive through concepts, is a type of cognition. To have the concept "dog," is at least to be potentially conscious of those respects in which representations of all dogs are similar and the respects in which the representations of all dogs are different from the representations of nondogs.

The distinguishing feature of human representation is not introduced in the Transcendental Deduction through a contrast with animal representation, as it is in the Lectures on Logic. Nevertheless, the same difference is suggested there as in the Logic. The B-Deduction begins with the suggestion that the distinguishing "act of spontaneity" of the faculty of the understanding, an act which has "the general title 'synthesis,'" is "the combination of a manifold in general." This way of putting the matter makes it sound as if what is at issue is the act itself of combining or putting together representations. On this reading, however, the act in which my dog combines his representations of another dog and a squirrel in order to compare them would count as an act of understanding, and this can't be right. Fortunately, Kant immediately corrects this misleading impression. For he tells us, first, that it is not the mere combination of representations which is the act of understanding, but the representation of the combination, and, second, that what is contained in combination is not merely a manifold and its synthesis, but also the representation of the unity of the combination or synthesis of a manifold: "of all representations combination is the only one which cannot be given through objects." But the concept of combination includes, besides the concept of the manifold and of its synthesis, also the concept of the unity of the manifold. Combination is the representation of the synthetic unity of the manifold. The representation of this unity cannot, therefore, arise out of the combination. On the contrary, it is what, by adding itself to the representation of the manifold, first makes possible the concept of the combination." That is, the understanding combines a manifold in the sense that it represents the manifold as unified in a single representation; it represents the unity of what is manifold. Each of our representations of dogs is itself a synthesis or combination of a manifold of different representations. My dog, Mac, insofar as he is acquainted with objects, can have such synthetic representations. Indeed, he can represent two representations of dogs together and note their similarity. But he cannot represent that similarity of representation itself in a single representation by recognizing that both of these synthetic representations have been synthesized in the same way and that they are both instances of the same type of representation, "dog." The representation in which we recognize that Mac is similar to Fido and all other dogs in respect of being a dog is of course the judgment that Mac is a dog. It is for this reason that in the Logic Kant explicitly asserts that the distinguishing mark of human cognition is that it is discursive.

It is important to note that for Kant cognition involves two representations that are, in principle, separate and distinct. First, there is no cognition
without acquaintance: every cognitive act takes as its object a representation which itself is a synthesis or combination of a variety of other representations. Kant tells us that this is a representation of a type that a mere animal can have. But second, for cognition of a human kind to occur, there must be a second act that involves a second representation: an act in which we represent the unitary character of the act of combination in which we generate the first representation. That is, cognition is acquaintance together with consciousness of the unity of the synthesis of that with which we are acquainted.

In both the A-Deduction and the B-Deduction Kant immediately follows his discussions of the consciousness of the unity of synthesis with the first introduction of the necessity of the unity of apperception. This “I think,” which must be capable of accompanying all of my cognitive representations, is itself, for Kant, a representation, a representation which embodies a consciousness of the unity of the synthesis of all that is manifold in my experience. “The synthetic proposition, that all the variety of empirical consciousness must be combined in one single self-consciousness, is the absolutely first and synthetic principle of our thought in general. But it must not be forgotten that the bare representation ‘I’ in relation to all other representations (the collective unity of which it makes possible) is transcendental consciousness.” Indeed, this “I think” is a specific kind of representation, a “thought.” “On the other hand, in the transcendental synthesis of the manifold of representations in general, and therefore in the synthetic original unity of apperception, I am conscious of myself, not as I appear to myself, nor as I am in myself, but only that I am. This representation is a thought, not an intuition.”

Kant’s line of argument here seems to be as follows. What is distinctive about human cognition is the ability to represent or be conscious of the unifying or combining character of our own mental activity in a single unifying representation. Typically, such a representation itself ultimately involves a concept applied in a judgment to a synthesized manifold; for example, “That is a dog.” When one represents in this way, what is represented is the type of synthesizing character of one’s own activity. As such, every such representing act, no matter what concept is applied, is also an act of self-representing, an act in which one conceptually represents one’s own combining activity. Since it is the synthetic representation of that dog that is conceptually characterized as “dog,” and that representation has that character partly in virtue of the character of the synthesizing activity that constituted that complex representation, it is one’s own activity that one types when one types a representation as one of a dog. So to be capable of conceptually recognizing something as a dog, one must be capable of conceptually recognizing one’s dog representations as one’s own representations, in the sense that they are recognized as the product of a certain sort of combining activity on my part. What I have that my dog, Mac, lacks is precisely this ability to be acquainted with objects with consciousness, that is, the reflective capacity to cognize and type my own acts. That which all such acts of combination share in common is just that they are all my acts. But insofar as I can cognize conceptually I have the reflective capacity to type my own acts, so I have the ability to conceptually represent, to think, my own acts as my own acts. That is, I can conceptually cognize, or think, an object only if the thought “I think” can accompany the act in which I think the object. For Kant, what the “I think” is necessary for is the capacity to judge and to conceptually represent objects by forming discursive judgments about them.

At the same time the possibility of the “I think” is also required if any representation or object is to be anything “‘to me.” Something is something “‘to me” only if it is recognizable by me as something which I am cognizing. That is, for a dog to be something to me I must be able to represent that the dog is being thought by me as a dog. But this possibility just is the possibility of representing the act in which I intend the dog as my act, that is, the possibility of the “I think” accompanying the cognition of the dog as dog. It is thus analytically true that some thing can be something to me only if I am capable of affixing the “I think” to its representation.

2. Self-Intention in Heidegger

The structure of Kant’s argument turns on his analysis of the distinctive feature of human mental life. Kant holds that we differ from the other animals in our capacity to cognize objects, rather than merely being perceptually acquainted with them. This cognitive capacity is interpreted by Kant as the human ability to represent the character of our own mental activity, and this root mental activity in turn is understood as the activity of combining or synthesizing our representations in ways that accord with certain rules or instantiate certain patterns. This synthesis itself, “is the mere result of the power of imagination, a blind but indispensable function of the soul.” Humans, through our capacity to represent this activity according to its type, or “to bring this synthesis to concepts,” are capable of discursive thought, judgment, and logical inference. Since my abilities in these areas are all rooted in my ability to represent the character of my own cognitive activity, and the common feature of all of that activity is that it is my activity, if I am capable
of cognition, in Kant's technical sense, then I am also capable of representing my representations as my representations. That is, a necessary condition on human cognition is our capacity to characterize each of our thoughts as our thoughts.

What does Heidegger think about all of this? How, specifically, does the conceptual cognition of the "I think" enter into Heidegger's transcendental discussions of intentionality? The quick answer to this question is: not much. Heidegger of course accepts that we have the capacity to conceptually intend each of our cognitive acts of recognition or judgment as our own. He is even willing to go further than Kant and to generalize to non-judgmental, noncognitive acts the formal requirement that all intentional acts directed toward something by a Daseinish intentional agent involve an intention directed toward itself by that agent. "(Formally, it is unassailable to speak of the ego as consciousness of something that is at the same time conscious of itself. . . . To intentionality belongs, not only a self-directing-toward and not only an understanding of the being of the being toward which it is directed, but also the associated unveiling of the self which is comporting itself here."

But at the same time that he asserts the necessity of such self-directed intentionality, he also radically rethink the character of that self-directedness.

The "I think" that concerns Kant is at once a condition on conceptual representation and itself a conceptual representation, or thought. In Kant, the "I think" is tied up with our ability to reflect and make conceptually present to ourselves the nature of our own cognitive activity. While Heidegger doesn't for a moment doubt that such reflective cognitive intentions are possible, he isn't much interested in them. He isn't interested in the Kantian "I think" because he believes that such reflective conceptual intentions are derivative from a more basic type of self-disclosure, a kind of self-disclosure which itself is a necessary condition on a more basic kind of intentionality than that embodied in discursive, judgmental thought: "The Dasein, as existing, is there for itself, even when the ego does not direct itself to itself in the manner of its own peculiar turning around and turning back, which in phenomenology is called inner perception as contrasted with outer. The self is there for the Dasein itself without reflection and without inner perception, before all reflection."

Just as in Kant the conceptual character of the "I think" is tied up with the cognitive nature of the intentionality for which it is necessary, the character of this nonreflective, noncognitive (in Kant's sense), more basic type of Heideggerian self-directed intention is tied up with the distinctive kind of intentionality for which it is supposed to be necessary. In attempting to describe the character of this nonreflective self-intention, Heidegger appeals to a description of the way in which we intend entities when we pursue ends and care for and about things. Dasein, he tells us, "never finds itself otherwise than in the things themselves, and in fact in those things that daily surround it. It finds itself primarily and constantly in things because, tending them, distressed by them, it always in some way or other rests in things. Each of us is what he pursues and cares for. In everyday terms, we understand ourselves and our existence by way of the activities we pursue and the things we take care of. We understand ourselves by starting from them because the Dasein finds itself primarily in things."

On its surface, this quotation asserts that the primary form of self-directed intentionality is wrapped up in our abilities to "tend" entities, or be distressed by them, or take care of them. There is no doubt, of course, that we intend an entity when we tend it or take care of it. I can only "take care" of my computer or be distressed by my fungus-ridden peach tree insofar as I am capable of intending or being directed toward the computer or the tree. Indeed, I can only be engaged with these things in these ways if I intend the computer as a computer or the tree as a tree. My distress for the tree presupposes that I take the tree to be diseased, that is, as a tree of a certain sort that is failing to satisfy the norms appropriate to that sort. And I can care for the computer only if I take it to be a computer. But these truisms lead to two puzzles. First, just how is a self-directed intention involved in these intentional comportments? And second, given that being distressed by a tree or taking care of a computer seem to involve treating the tree as a tree and the computer as a computer, why does Heidegger think that such intentional acts are nonreflective, or noncognitions, in Kant's sense? We will approach the answer to the first question by considering the second.

We can begin to answer this question if we remind ourselves that even in Kant it is not quite true that the ability to intend a tree as a tree, or a dog as a dog, depends upon the intentional capacity to judge that the tree is a tree by forming a conceptual representation of a tree. For Kant, animals, such as my dog, Mac, can be acquainted with trees as trees and dogs as dogs in the sense that they can compare these objects in respect to similarity and difference, even though they are incapable of conceptually recognizing and judging that some tree is a tree, that is, that it conforms to the concept of a tree. It is only because Mac and we, have an imagination that has the blind power of representing dogs according to the schema of doghood that we, but not Mac, can recognize that we are intending dogs as dogs. So, perhaps surprisingly, when Heidegger in this passage suggests that there is a precognitive, prejudgmental ability to intend entities as belonging to kinds, for example in being distressed by things or taking care of them, his assertion is simply orthodox Kant.

Heidegger is also an orthodox Kantian in a second important respect. Kant, and Heidegger, believe that there is a significant intentional divide between animals and humans, although they locate this divide in different distinctio
For Kant, as we have seen, it doesn’t follow from the fact that Mac can intend another dog in a doggy way that Mac can recognize that what he is doing is intending a dog as a dog. And failing that ability, Mac can never be rational and think, or act, out of a recognition of principle. Heidegger, of course, also denies animals these Kantian, rational capacities. But, importantly, he also denies them a second, prior, intentional capacity, of which Kant does not speak. Humans, who are Dasein, are in such a way as to be “in a world.” Animals, at most, are “world poor.” What capacity for intentional content does “being-in-the-world” track?

According to a familiar list, Heidegger says that beings who are in the world are capable of the following intentional comportments, and entities that are not in-the-world, such as animals, are not capable of these kinds of comportments: “Working on something with something, producing something, cultivating and caring for something, putting something to use, employing something for something.” Notice two things about this list. First, all of these intentional comportments are practical rather than judgmental or cognitive. When one produces something, or cultivates and cares for something, or employs something for something, one engages in an overt practical activity that has some teleological point. Second, included in this list of practical intentional comportments is “cultivating and caring for something,” and “caring for something” is precisely what, in another context, Heidegger specifies as the locus of human self-directed intentionality. “Each of us is what he pursues and cares for. In everyday terms, we understand ourselves and our existence by way of the activities we pursue and the things we take care of.”

In what sense are these kinds of overt practical intentional performances characteristic of human intentionality? Surely animals are capable of acting in order to achieve practical ends, aren’t they? Well, yes and no. They are, of course, capable of acting so as to attain ends that they require in order to stay alive. But most animals are surely incapable of the specific kinds of practical intentional performances which are included in Heidegger’s list of the modes of “being-in.” I cultivate and care for my peach tree; my dog, Mac, is incapable of such action. I work on my garden with a shovel; Mac is incapable of doing so. I employ alcohol for disinfecting the saw I use to prune my diseased tree; Mac cannot employ something for something. All of these varieties of practical comportment essentially involve a particular way of interacting with objects. In each of these activities both the objects which we use and the objects which we use them on seem to be typed in a determinate way. In each of these cases the overt, practical, intentional activity tacitly involves intending an entity or entities as fulfilling or potentially fulfilling some job classification or other, as “in order to” satisfy some instrumental role. One can’t employ alcohol for disinfecting unless one can intend something as a disinfectant, that is, as an entity to be used in order to kill fungus on a tool or organism. One can’t cultivate and care for a peach tree unless one intends the seedling to be cultivated into a fruit-bearing tree, that is, as something for producing, or in order to produce, fruit. I can’t use this entity as a tool which is a shovel unless I can intend it as to be used in order to accomplish a certain kind of task, the task of digging holes in the ground.

So, for Heidegger, insofar as Dasein is being in the world, Dasein is capable of certain types of overt intentional performances, such as cultivating and caring for something, or employing something for something, and these types of performances all involve intending something as “in order to” fulfill some job classification or other. To intend something as “in order to” satisfy some job classification is, for Heidegger, just to intend it as a piece of equipment or as ready-to-hand. Heidegger thinks, wrongly as it turns out, that only humans can intend the ready-to-hand as ready-to-hand. But, formally, it is a necessary condition on the possibility of an entity being Dasein that it is always intending entities as ready-to-hand. “Dasein always assigns itself from a ‘for-the-sake-of-which’ to the ‘with-which’ of an involvement; that is to say, to the extent that it is, it always lets entities be encountered as ready-to-hand.”

This ability to intend things as belonging to or adhering to equipment types, as ready-to-hand, provides the base step for all of Heidegger’s transcendental arguments. Just as Kant raises the question of what else we must intend and in what other ways must we be capable of intending if we are to be able to intend entities by conceptually cognizing them in judgment, Heidegger raises the question of what else and in what other ways we must be capable of intending if we are to be able to intend entities as ready-to-hand. And, just as Kant in turn argues that the ability to conceptually cognize objects in judgments is necessary for the ability to intend a single unified world of possible experience or empirical knowledge, Heidegger argues that the ability to intend entities as ready-to-hand is necessary for a variety of other kinds of intentional comportments. Most notably, he argues that the ability to intend entities as equipment, together with all of the other types of intentional comportments that are implicated in this intentional accomplishment, are necessary for the possibility of those types of intentions which Kant associates with the ability to reflectively cognize. In the remainder of this chapter I will briefly lay out the overall structure of Heidegger’s transcendental argument, paying special attention to the role and nature of Heidegger’s replacement for transcendental apperception, the “for-the-sake-of-which.”

Heidegger asserts that there are three salient necessary conditions on intending a tool as a tool. That is, he holds that any agent that can intend a tool as a tool must also intend in these other ways. In the order I will treat
them here these conditions are: (1) One can not intend anything as belonging to an in-order-to type unless one also intends other entities as belonging to other in-order-to types. (2) One can not intend anything as belonging to an “in-order-to” type unless one also intends what it is for something to belong to some in-order-to type. (3) One can not intend anything as belonging to an “in-order-to” type unless one also intends oneself as “that for the sake of which” one engages in the activity in which one engages. This last, self-directed, type of intention plays the same structural role in Heidegger’s thought that the “I think” does in Kant.

First, Heidegger holds that all intentions directed toward the ready-to-hand as ready-to-hand are holistic. One cannot intend anything as belonging to an in-order-to type unless one also intends other entities as belonging to other in-order-to types. “Taken strictly, there is no such thing as an equipment. To the being of any equipment there always belongs a totality of equipment, in which it can be the equipment it is. . . . Equipment—in accordance with its equipmentality—always is in terms of [auf] its belonging to other equipment.” That is, Heidegger holds that when I reach for my alcohol in order to disinfect the blade of my saw so that I don’t infect other parts of the peach tree or other trees, by the very nature of the case that very act involves not merely intending the alcohol as a disinfectant but also involves intending the saw as an instrument for pruning, the rag as an instrument for wiping, the tree as in order to bear fruit, and so on. His reasons for asserting this have to do with the overtly teleological character of the order of the “in-order-to” and the fact that all teleological determinations are holistic in just this way. What something is in order to accomplish is something that itself is only determinate in terms of other in-order-to roles.

Heidegger also holds that (2) one intends any entity as in-order-to only if one also intends what it is for something to belong to some in-order-to type. Whenever we let there be an involvement with something in something beforehand, our doing so is grounded in our understanding such things as letting something be involved, and such things as the “with-which” and “in-which” of involvements. Anything of this sort, and anything else that is basic for it, such as the “towards-this” as that in which there is an involvement, or such as the “for-the-sake-of-which” to which every “towards-which” ultimately goes back—all of these must be disclosed beforehand with a certain intelligibility. That is, Heidegger asserts that when we, say, employ the alcohol as a disinfectant, we must in some sense intend not merely the alcohol, but also what it is for something to be properly employed to achieve some specified end. And, since to tacitly intend this one must also have some tacit understanding of the form of the holistic structures in terms of which anything can be in-order-to, in intending the alcohol as disinfectant I am also intending “world,” or “that wherein Dasein understands itself beforehand in the mode of assigning itself.”

Heidegger insists, explicitly and often, on the necessity of one being able to intend the world and its structure if one is to intend an entity as equipment or as ready-to-hand. The argument turns, once again, on the holistic character of the order of the ready-to-hand. Heidegger asserts, plausibly, that it is a mistake to think of a ready-to-hand entity as just an individual whose identity conditions turn on spatial and temporal continuity, an individual that happens to be such that it can be used in a certain way. Broken tools can’t be used as they are “in order to be” used, and nothing that can be used in a certain way counts as belonging to a tool type. Rather, in the case of equipment, that there is some unified individual at all to be intended is constituted precisely by what it is to be used for. The identity and individuation conditions on ready-to-hand entities are themselves “in-order-to” determinations. “The specific thisness of a piece of equipment, its individuation, if we take the word in a completely formal sense, is not determined primarily by space and time in the sense that it appears in a determinate space and time position. Instead, what determines a piece of equipment as an individual is in each instance its equipmental character and equipmental contexture.”

According to Heidegger, then, not all spatially and temporally continuous or connected masses constitute individuals, and not all individual tools are spatially and temporally continuous and connected masses. A Band-Aid affixed to a severed hand is not an individual of any order and a set of bookends can be a single tool. It is that an entity is to be used in order to accomplish some task, then, that constitutes the entity as a single equipmental entity. But, as the end of this quote hints, no tool can have an equipmental character, an “in-order-to” role, apart from belonging to an equipmental contexture, a context of mutually supporting and sustaining teleologically organized roles. This “belonging to” such a context, however, is no fact about the individual tool independent of being intended as to be intended as belonging to such a context. When instantiated in action, rather than judgment, such “being intended as belonging to an equipmental contexture” is always embodied in some ongoing, integrated pattern or schema of behavior by an agent in which the agent employs a whole series of tools from a given tool chest in order to accomplish ends that are characteristic of the use of that tool chest. What I do with the alcohol when I rub down my blade with a rag counts as employing the alcohol as a disinfectant only within the pattern of activity that constitutes my gardening. This ongoing, integrated pattern or schema of behavior by an agent in which the agent employs a whole series of tools from a given tool chest, in order to accomplish ends that are characteristic of the use of that tool chest, displays an understanding of how
things and activities can be fit together in order to accomplish ends. It is itself an intentional act, an act that amounts to an intentional prejudgmental understanding of the holistic structures in terms of which anything can be in-order-to. Since an intention directed toward a given piece of equipment as a piece of equipment can only occur as part of such an ongoing set of activities, it is a necessary condition on intending a ready-to-hand entity that one also intend, indeed understand, the structure of relations that constitute a world or equipmental context in which tools are.

This characteristic Heideggerian assertion, that the structure of the equipmental context in which tools function “must be disclosed beforehand with a certain intelligibility,” is the key to understanding Heidegger’s claims regarding the role of self-directed intentionality. For, Heidegger holds, it is part of the structure of the world that every such context is anchored by some “that for the sake of which,” some “potentially for being” Dasein itself, which provides the point of the context. “In understanding a context of relations such as we have mentioned, Dasein has assigned itself to an ‘in order to,’ and it has done so in terms of a potentiality-for-being for the sake of which it itself is.” The thought is simply this. Every teleological process is organized to realize some end. As Aristotle taught, this end can be of one of two types. Either, as in building, the end is such that when it is attained the process ceases. Or, as in living, the end is attained only if the process continues. In the latter case, all that occurs in the process, respiration, digestion, and so forth, is for the sake of the continuation of the process; although the act of respiration is in order to oxygenate the blood, oxygenation of the blood is for the sake of the life of the organism. Now, the typically human pattern of tool-using behavior that constitutes our primary kind of intentional comportment toward tools is of the second type. Gardening is a way of acting which uses particular tools in particular prescribed ways in order to attain characteristic kinds of goals. While one gardens, that is, while one engages in these kinds of behavior, for these ends with these tools, in order to produce fruit and flowers, one acts so as to produce fruit and flowers only if one is a gardener, that is, only if one intends oneself as a gardener and intends the world as gardeners do. My dog acts as dogs act, but humans act as gardeners act, or shoemakers, or professors. So every act of gardening is, Heidegger believes, an implicit affirmation of oneself as a certain type of person, a gardener. I garden if, and only if, I understand myself as a gardener, and I engage in gardening acts for the sake of my being a gardener. I garden so that, or for the sake of, my being a gardener, that is, for the sake of the continuation of my gardening activity. Being a Dasein in the way of being a gardener is, as Kant puts it, an end in itself.

Heidegger thus argues that human activity is distinctive in that the patterns of activity and intentionality embodied in that activity have them- selves as ends, as well as having external ends. And, as such, any agent that acts in these ways does so for the sake of being a kind of agent, realizing a possible way of being Dasein. To see the world as a philosopher does, and to act with the tools of his trade as philosophers do, is itself to act for the sake of being a philosopher and intend oneself as a philosopher. This is Heidegger’s third necessary condition on an agent intending a tool as a tool. One can intend a tool as a tool only if, in caring for and cultivating things, in being distressed by them, or employing them for something, one intends oneself by way of the activities we pursue, as that for the sake of which we pursue them.

Kant argues that the possibility of the “I think” accompanying every act of cognition is a necessary condition on acts of conceptual cognition, or thought. In an exactly parallel manner, Heidegger argues that if an agent is capable of being in the world, of intending entities as tools that are to be used according to some equipmental type, then that agent also, thereby, intends herself as that for the sake of which her world, or the equipmental contexture to which she “assigns” herself, is organized. That is, Heidegger argues that the fact of the “for-the-sake-of-which” is a necessary condition on the possibility of intending a tool as a tool.

But Kant doesn’t merely argue that the possibility of the “I think” is necessary for cognition. He also argues that cognition, and with it the possibility of the “I think,” is itself necessary for several other kinds of intentional performance, most notably including intentions directed toward a coherent world of possible experience. Similarly, for Heidegger, the ability to intend equipment as equipment, and the coordinated ability to intend oneself as that for the sake of which one acts, are necessary for other kinds of intentional performance, most notably including precisely those types of intentions that Kant treats as basic to human intentionality, cognition, and the possibility of the “I think.”

That Heidegger holds that intending entities within an equipmental contexture, and thus being-in-the-world and intending oneself as the for-the-sake-of-which of the world, is necessary for cognition in Kant’s sense, judgment, and the possibility of the “I think,” is displayed by the priority that he accords to intentions directed toward the ready-to-hand over those directed toward the extant, or present-at-hand. Present-at-hand entities are those entities whose individuation conditions are such that they turn on spatial and temporal position, connectedness, and continuity, as well as causal powers. They are the ordinary substances that have been taken to be the basic entities since Aristotle. That intentions directed toward the extant are to be associated with intentions directed toward objects, in Kant’s sense, and thus with cognition and judgment, is indicated by Heidegger’s analysis of intentions directed toward the extant. For, he tells us, intentions directed toward the extant are actualized only in and through the act of assertion.
If this entity [e.g., a hammer] becomes the "object" of an assertion, then as soon as we begin this assertion, there is already a change-over in the fore-having. Something ready-to-hand with which we have to do or perform something, turns into something "about which" the assertion that points it out is made. . . . This leveling of the primordial "as" of circumspective interpretation to the "as" with presence-at-hand is given a definite character is the specialty of assertion.24

And assertion, for Heidegger, is "a pointing out which gives something a definite character and which communicates."25 So one intends an extant entity insofar as one makes an assertion about it, and one makes an assertion about it when one communicates that that entity has some definite character, that is, when one communicates that it is of some definite type. To point out that some entity is of some definite type, is to make a judgment about that entity. So, to intend the extant as the extant is to make a judgment concerning it. As, for Kant, objects as objects are the objects of judgment, Kant's objects of possible cognition are just Heidegger's extant entities.

Heidegger has a different theory of judgment from Kant. And for that reason there are important differences between Kant's understanding of cognitive intentions directed toward objects and Heidegger's understanding of intentions directed toward the present-at-hand. In particular, early Heidegger's emphasis on, and interpretation of, assertion embodies a modification of Kant. The fact that for Heidegger an assertion is always a pointing out or exhibition of that about which it is an assertion indicates that that about which the assertion is made must already have been intentionally given prior to the assertion. That is, for Heidegger, all judgment presupposes a prior intention directed toward the entity that is referred to in the assertion. Now, in Kant, judgment is always theoretically understood in terms of representation. What I intend when I judge is my own representation, and it is only by representing that representation as my own and as belonging to some type, that is, by making a judgment about it, that it becomes possible for me to cognitively represent. Heidegger, on the other hand, does not accept Kant's representational theory of intentionality. The cross-over, the transcendence of intentionality toward an entity other than myself, must, he suggests, have already occurred prior to my forming a judgment concerning that entity. If I didn't already intend an entity prior to my judging concerning it, the judgment could never be an intention directed toward that entity.

Assertion does not as such primarily unveil; instead, it is always, in its sense, already related to something antecedently given as unveiled. . . . Some being must be antecedently given as unveiled in order to serve as the possible about-which of an assertion. But so far as a being is antecedently given for a Dasein it has . . . the character of being within the world. Intentional comportment in the sense of assertion about something is founded in its ontological structure in the basic constitution of Dasein which we described as being-in-the-world.26

This analysis of judgment as assertion thus indicates the nature of the priority that Heidegger accords to intentions directed toward the ready-to-hand over those directed toward the present-at-hand. The way in which Heidegger often asserts this priority makes it seem as if the priority is a genetic one: one first intends an entity as ready-to-hand and then only later does one intend it as a substance or object. But this is misleading, at best. Rather, the priority is a transcendental priority: any agent capable of intending entities as continuing substances with properties must also be capable of intending entities as ready-to-hand or as useful for realizing some end.

The analysis of judgment as assertion also indicates the nature of Heidegger's argument in favor of the claim that being in the world, and thus intending oneself as the for-the-sake-of of an equipmental totality, is a necessary condition on Kantian style cognition, judgment, and the possibility of the "I think." In outline, the argument runs as follows. The act of judging about, or the typing of, objects is properly seen as the act of forming assertions about them. Since making an assertion about an object is essentially reflectively pointing something out or typing that object, that is, recognizing that what is intended shares features with other intended entities, and not reflectively recognizing that our intentions directed toward those entities share features, one can make assertions concerning those entities only if the entities are intended in some way other than through the act of judging them. Entities are primarily intended as entities only in our circumspective, coping activity that implicitly treats entities as typed by the in-order-to roles specified by the equipmental context in which we live. So, unless one were capable of intending things as ready-to-hand by being-in-the-world, one would be incapable of forming judgments, and thus incapable of cognition, in Kant's sense, or of conceptually attaching the "I think" to one's thoughts.

This transcendental argument sketch is clearly problematic in several different ways. Most obviously, to fill in the sketch one would need to show both that "assertion as such does not primarily unveil" and that entities as such can only be intended within the intentional structure which Heidegger calls "being-in-the-world." And it is anything but clear that there is anything in the Heideggerian corpus that is adequate to these argumentative tasks. It strikes me that there is a more promising strategy for reaching Heidegger's conclusion from his premises than the one which Heidegger himself mostly pursues. For, arguably, the ability to use an articulate language is a necessary condition on the possibility of making discursive judgments. So, if one can support the plausible thesis that language itself is a tool chest of specialized tool types, it would follow from Heidegger's transcendental discussion of the conditions on intending equipment as equipment that no agent could make explicit judgments unless they were also Dasein, or being-in-the-world.
Acknowledging that Heidegger is not much interested in this strategy, however, does not detract from the originality of the early Heidegger’s transcendental project. For that project amounts to the attempt to place the entire Kantian transcendental project, with its emphasis on the centrality of the reflective act of typing our own mental activity, within a broader intentional context. For Heidegger, that intentional context is provided by a manner of coping with the world which is distinctively human, required for Kantian cognition, and does not require the ability to make conceptual judgments regarding one’s own mental activity. Heidegger’s name for this kind of intentional comportment is “being-in-the-world,” and it involves the ability to intend oneself as a certain type of agent by intending entities within the world as to-be-used in determinate ways to achieve determinate ends.