tient. But this interpretation is simply mistaken. The best Kantian acts out of loving concern for her friend. It is, however, a concern which she who is committed to moral principles, or universalizable principles, can endorse. Not only is this an acceptable reason, the patient has a better reason to trust her Kantian friend, I would argue, because the Kantian agent is not only concerned for a friend's good, but for that good as it is conceived by the friend.

My remarks about Kant are intended to serve a dual purpose. First, to note that nothing rules out, indeed much favors, trusting a Kantian agent. And, second, to argue for a pluralism of the bases of trust. Sometimes we trust others because they are morally principled, sometimes simply because they have a particular affection for us. Trust is rational in both cases.

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Kagan, Shelly. *Normative Ethics*. Dimensions of Philosophy Series. Edited by Norman Daniels and Keith Lehrer.
Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1998. Pp. 337. $25.00 (paper).

Shelly Kagan's *Normative Ethics* is part of the Dimensions of Philosophy Series of texts from Westview Press. Like the other members of this series, it presents a sweeping overview of some of the best recent work in philosophy, which leaves the reader with an excellent grasp of the questions, problems, and types of solutions that define contemporary normative ethics. Normative ethics, as Kagan defines it, "involves substantive proposals concerning how to act, how to live, or what kind of person to be. In particular, it attempts to state and defend the most basic principles governing these matters" (p. 2). The book thus asks: "Is there a single ultimate moral principle from which all other moral principles can be derived?" Although the book asks this question, it does not really attempt to discover and defend an ultimate moral principle. Kagan's arguments aim rather at setting out the strengths and weaknesses of many different principles. "Even if there is no one single fundamental principle," he writes, "we can still try to arrive at a complete list of basic moral principles—or, at the very least, a list of some of the most important ones" (p. 2). The neutrality and fairness Kagan has striven for in setting out rival positions are important features of the book. I suspect that, especially to many philosophers familiar with Kagan's thorough and forceful presentations of his own philosophical views, his success in achieving this goal will also be a surprising feature of the book. The shape and contours of much of our morality, with all of its complexity and subtlety, are accurately captured by Kagan.

Contemporary approaches to normative ethics vary a good deal depending on whether they emphasize historical texts or moral principles alone. At one extreme, we find a primary focus on the text of particular philosophers. This *pure textualist* approach involves the scholarly study of the actual arguments of particular normative ethicists. At the other extreme, we find a focus on particular normative principles and arguments detached from any particular classic texts. This pure philosophical approach does develop principles and arguments drawn from other philosophers, but it is focused on principles, distinctions, and arguments.

Of course, these are two extremes, with most philosophers failing somewhere in between. Most philosophers are semitextualist, in that they build on the text of others and give pride of place to the classics of philosophy, but their goal is not a strictly scholarly or historical interpretation of a text. Their goal is instead a creative reconstruction and further development of the basic ideas and suggestions of the philosopher in question. For the philosophical textualist, the question is what reconstruction of the argument or interpretation of the main ideas of the text make the most philosophical sense.

Kagan embraces the pure philosophical approach. His presentation of normative ethics incorporates the arguments and conclusions of both contemporary and classical ethicists without any discussion of the actual theorists in question. From a pedagogical point of view, this approach has the advantage of not cluttering up the text with too many references and names. (References are provided, however, in an annotated bibliography of suggested readings for each chapter.) Indeed, Kagan clearly states that "no attempt at all will be made to describe the views of any particular philosopher" (p. 9). Kagan is scrupulous in this regard. I believe that he does not refer to any particular philosopher in the main text of the book. (In the index, there are references to Captain Cook, Mom, and Ari, Chuck, Elana, Gina, and Rebecca, who make appearances in examples.) Although it is a worthwhile approach to focus directly on the rival theories of normative ethics themselves, surely it would not be too distracting to identify at least the views of those philosophers that are part of any list of the great normative theorists. (I suppose, however, that contemporary ethicists cannot complain about not being mentioned or credited for ideas, since even the views of Hobbes, Mill, and Kant are not identified.) I suspect that Kagan's reason for this approach is twofold. First, it is hard to make any comment about the position of Hobbes, Mill, or Kant, for example, that is not contested by contemporary interpreters of the philosopher in question. Kagan may not want to enter these waters at all because, if one even dips in a foot, one is likely to be swept away and sucked under. Second, since his approach is clearly the pure philosophical approach, the authority of particular philosophers adds no justificatory support and thus is irrelevant to the explicit task of the book. At any rate, it is an additional general feature of this book that it focuses exclusively on principles and arguments.

Kagan's book is divided into two parts. The first part is called "Factors" and the second part is called "Foundations." A normative factor is a consideration that "makes a given act have the particular moral status it does" (p. 18). It is a right-making or wrong-making consideration. Since many different factors are typically at stake when evaluating a particular action, it is the "interaction" of the various factors that determines the ultimate moral status of the act. The picture here is reminiscent of W. D. Ross's deontological intuitionism. Moral factors are prima facie right making considerations which determine the status of an act if there are no other factors involved. The ultimate status of any action is determined by considering the significance of all of the moral factors at stake in the particular situation.

Although the approaches of Kagan and Ross are metaphysically similar, Kagan's moral epistemology is not classical intuitionism. Like so much contemporary ethical theory, he endorses a coherentist model of reflective equilibrium. The goal of the book is to achieve maximum coherence between the theory and principles we can endorse, on the one hand, and our considered moral judg-

ments or intuitions, on the other hand. Of course, Kagan rejects the picture of normative ethics as involving simply the empirical task of describing the moral code of a particular society. Since the question is what we should do and not simply what we think we should do, normative ethics requires that we both state and "*defend* the substantive moral claims." Kagan emphasizes that "defending a moral claim—showing that it really does tell the truth about how people ought to act—is something quite different from merely reporting what this or that group has thought about the matter" (p. 8). Kagan's dismissal of social relativism about ethics is, of course, part of the standard fare of introductions to ethics. And as I have said, he embraces a broad conception of reflective equilibrium that includes a wide-ranging consideration of particular moral intuitions, plausible principles, and a compelling conception of the nature and point of ethics itself.

Common sense morality is, of course, a natural starting point for exploring normative ethics. If we want to know what is right, the natural place to start is with what we think is right. Common sense morality can then be probed and investigated to see if it is in fact sound. A large part of this process will involve searching out internal inconsistencies. If we do not go beyond this type of minimal coherence, however, it is hard to see how we achieve the independence from what we happen to believe, which is presupposed in the rejection of social relativism. Given the historical and cultural diversity of "common sense" morality and the rejection of the idea that we simply want to record what *we* happen to *think* is right, we are not entitled to *simply* rely on widespread intuitions as a basis for substantive claims in normative ethics. The justification of morality must start with common sense morality, but it must go on from this starting point and probe the foundations of morality as well. So, the coherentist project is to start by identifying a common sense moral factor. Next, we explore the content and scope of the factor. Finally, we inquire, in ever increasing depth, as to the normative significance of the factor in question. Is it a basic moral factor or is it based on some other more basic factor? Does it cohere with a plausible conception of the foundations of ethics and with the nature or purpose of morality?

Kagan begins his discussion of moral factors with the goodness of outcomes. His focus is on competing theories of intrinsic value. He discusses different *conceptions of well-being* (in particular, hedonist theories, desire or preference theories, objective list theories, perfectionist theories and the issue of whether one should maximize total or average well-being), *conceptions of distributive equality,* and the role of *culpability, fairness, and desert* in the evaluation of outcomes. As this summary indicates, Kagan covers an incredible amount of ground but he still manages to be surprisingly thorough. For each factor or theory, he first presents in an appealing form the basic idea and its basic rationale. Next, he considers the different alternative ways that one might specify the factor or develop the theory. He concludes by clearly explaining, but explicitly leaving unresolved, the more difficult issues and questions facing the view in question. This is Kagan's basic approach throughout the book.

The next major factor discussed is the moral relevance of doing harm. The distinctions and arguments that are necessary for an adequate account of the constraint on harming are much less familiar, and perhaps less intuitive, than the distinctions between different conceptions of welfare. Kagan's careful and unusually accessible discussion of this constraint should thus prove especially useful. Although the details of these issues cannot here be reviewed, Kagan provides

a clear account of the role of *thresholds* in articulating the difference between moderate and absolutist constraints on harming. He also uses thresholds to explain the clear difference between moderate theories of constraints, which allow the value of outcomes to sometimes override the constraint, and consequentialist theories, which treat constraints as derivative secondary rules that typically promote the goodness of outcomes.

Three other considerations add complexity to any account of the constraint on harming. First, intuitively, the significance of the constraint against harming will vary with the *kind* of harm that is in question. Second, few actions are certain to result in harm to others, and many intuitively permissible actions do involve some *risk* that others will be harmed, so the question is how much risk of a harm is necessary for an action to fall under the constraint against harming. Specifying a threshold function which incorporates these considerations is thus a key task in understanding the constraint against harming. Another issue that requires more attention than it typically receives is specifying the *scope* of the constraint against harming. This turns out to be much more difficult than one might expect. The issues here involve (1) distinguishing between doing and allowing in a way which maps the common sense distinction; (2) specifying what counts as harming (is causing offense or psychological distress harming?); and (3) determining the comparative significance of local versus overall or global harms. Each of these issues is more difficult than one would expect.

After discussing the basic constraint on doing harm, and the related but different constraint on intending harm, Kagan explores the relevance of consent, innocence, self-defense, responses to threats, and issues of compensation. He also has substantial discussions of lying and deception, promising, considerations of fair play, property rights, social and natural roles, gratitude, and self-respect. The final chapter of the first part of the book on moral factors includes discussions of (1) whether consequentialism demands too much; (2) the relevance of the cost to the moral agent which may result from promoting the good; and (3) a brief discussion of approaches which focus primarily on rights rather than requirements.

In his earlier book *The Limits of Morality*, Kagan developed a thorough and rigorous critique of deontological constraints and options. In *Normative Ethics*, we get a simpler and more accessible treatment of these problems. In addition, throughout his new book, Kagan presents and evaluates the relevance of these moral factors in an evenhanded manner and with a studiously impartial tone. As a consequentialist, I often found his discussion to be overly generous in its evaluation of common sense deontological factors, but I must concede that Kagan does an excellent job describing the deontological contours of common sense morality.

The second part of the book is called "Foundations" and is composed of a chapter on "Teleological Foundations" and a chapter on "Deontological Foundations." The discussion of foundations adds significant depth to the topology of the first part. Kagan organizes his discussion in a fruitful way by distinguishing foundational considerations from "focal points," and normative factors. Focal points include acts, rules, and virtues of character. He thus distinguishes different versions of foundational teleology or deontology in virtue of a particular focal point and the relevance of a moral factor given that focal point. Although the distinction between foundations, focal points, and factors may sound confusing,

it proves to provide a useful and enlightening tool for presenting and evaluating different foundational theories. This is the first highlight of this part of the book.

The second highlight is Kagan's insight into how the interaction between foundational considerations and the justification of moral factors often depends on whether one chooses acts or rules as the moral focal point. As a result, Kagan is able to clearly explain why foundational egoism or consequentialism, which takes rules as its evaluative focal point, generates deontology at the factoral level. This discussion is conjoined with an unusually clear discussion of both (1) why a realistic foundational rule-consequentialist theory does not collapse into act-consequentialism at the factoral level, and (2) the complexities in specifying a plausible set of realistic compliance conditions for evaluating different sets of rules.

The discussion of deontological foundational theories includes discussions of (1) *contractarianism* and the issues of specifying the conditions of the contract, the nature of the contractors, and the compliance conditions assumed by the contract; (2) five interpretations of the *universalizability* requirement on moral principles; (3) *the ideal observer theory* and the problems of specifying the characteristics of ideal moral judges in nonmoral terms; (4) foundational *pluralism* and the many possibilities for combining distinct foundational considerations; and (5) theories based on the idea that the content of morality is a *reflection* of human nature. This last category covers a wide and diverse group of considerations about the relationship between morality and our social nature, our rational nature, our capacity for autonomy, and the distinctive personal point of view of each agent. These considerations may be appealed to in order to directly evaluate normative factors, but more often they are used to further justify a foundational consideration such as egoism, consequentialism, contractarianism, or universalizability. These considerations move us, seamlessly, from normative ethics to metaethics and thus also to the broader overall coherence which is ultimately necessary for a justification of normative principles.

Once again, of course, Kagan cannot fully discuss all of these deontological options and issues. Nonetheless, he has done a surprisingly good job providing a basic sketch of each view, explaining its appeal, and pointing out the many options and issues involved in fleshing it out into a fully articulated foundational theory. Kagan states that his goal has been to "give some sense of each theory's strengths and weaknesses . . . and to make each of these theories appear plausible" (p. 301). Kagan also argues that the combination of these different deontological foundations with different focal points can produce novel and surprising results at the factoral level. He thus cautions against the common overconfidence on the part of consequentialists and deontologists in assuming that their sketchy accounts of a foundational theory provide a justification of common sense morality.

Kagan's book provides a rich and detailed overview of normative ethics. Although he does not emphasize virtue theory or focus on rights-based approaches, I believe that it is the most accurate and philosophically sophisticated introductory text available to date. It should prove especially useful to advanced undergraduates, graduate students, and teachers of normative ethics. Kagan's distinction between foundations, focal points, and factors provides a model for clarity that we should all follow in our thinking about normative principles and their justification.

Kagan begins his book with the question "How should one live?" and he ends the book with the observation on that "Moral wisdom begins with the realization that I may not already know the answer." Readers of this book will surely be wiser as a result.

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Kane, Robert. *The Significance of Free Will.*
New York: Oxford University Press, 1996. Pp. 268. $52.00 (cloth); $19.95 (paper).

The Significance of Free Will is one of the very finest books on free will and responsibility. Kane's work exhibits virtually exhaustive scholarship on the topic, sensitive and intelligent analysis of the issues, and a careful and thorough unfolding of an attractive and important position. Indeed, Kane develops a highly original view that has matured for several decades, and that has benefited from his careful reflection on criticisms from many of the best philosophers who work in this area. This landmark book has already engendered a very lively debate, which is certain to continue for quite some time.

Kane's most important condition for a person's moral responsibility for an event is one that he calls UR (for "Ultimate Responsibility"). UR has two components. The first (in essence, Kane's formulations of these components are more precise, p. 35) is that to be ultimately responsible for an event, the agent must have voluntarily been able to do otherwise. The second is that to be ultimately responsible for an event, the agent must be responsible for any sufficient ground or cause or explanation of the event. Each of these components may rule out responsibility in case determinism is true, but in Kane's view, the second does so more clearly than the first. The first would rule out responsibility given that causal determinism precludes agents from having done otherwise, although Kane is very much aware that compatibilists have advanced conditional analyses of "could have done otherwise" that are difficult to undermine decisively (pp. 44–59). It is the second component that would more convincingly rule out responsibility, since if determinism were true, there would be a sufficient causal condition for any action whose existence precedes the agent's birth, for which she could not be responsible (pp. 73–77).

In Kane's positive view, the paradigm case of an action for which an agent is morally responsible is one of moral or prudential struggle, in which there are reasons for and against performing the action in question. The sequence that produces the action begins with the agent's character and motives, and proceeds through the agent's making an effort of will to act, which results in the choice for a particular action. The effort of will is a struggle to choose in one way in a situation in which there are countervailing pressures. This effort is explained by the agent's character and motives, it is *indeterminate*, and as a result, the decision produced by the effort is *undetermined*. Kane draws an analogy between such an effort of will and a quantum event: